ROBERT WRIGH |
"The Postmodern Mind" from THE MORAL ANIMAL by Robert Wright
All told, the Darwinian notion of
the unconscious is more radical than the Freudian one. The sources of
self-deception are more numerous, diverse, and deeply rooted, and the line
between conscious and unconscious is less clear. Freud described Freudianism as
an attempt to "prove to the 'ego' of each one of us that he is not even
master in his own house, but that he must remain content with the veriest
scraps of information about what is going on unconsciously in his own mind."
By Darwinian lights, this wording almost gives too much credit to the
"self." It seems to suggest an otherwise clear-seeing mental entity
getting deluded in various ways. To an evolutionary psychologist, the delusion
seems so pervasive that the usefulness of thinking about any distinct core of
honesty falls into doubt.
Indeed, the commonsense way of
thinking about the relation between our thoughts and feelings, on the one hand,
and our pursuit of goals, on the other, is not just wrong, but backward. We
tend to think of ourselves as making judgments and then behaving accordingly:
"we" decide who is nice and then befriend them; "we" decide
who is upstanding and applaud them; "we" figure out who is wrong and
oppose them; "we" figure out what is true and abide by it. To this
picture Freud would add that often we have goals we aren't aware of, goals that
may get pursued in oblique, even counterproductive, ways-and that our
perception of the world may get warped in the process.
But if evolutionary psychology is
on track, the whole picture needs to be turned inside out. We believe the
things—about morality, personal worth, even objective truth—that lead to
behaviors that get our genes into the next generation. (Or at least we believe
the kinds of things that, in the environment of our evolution, would have been
likely to get our genes into the next generation.) It is the behavioral
goals—status, sex, effective coalition, parental investment, and so on—that
remain steadfast while our view of reality adjusts to accommodate this
constancy. What is in our genes' interests is what seems "right"—morally right, objectively right, whatever sort of rightness is in order.
In short: if Freud stressed
people's difficulty in seeing the truth about themselves, the new Darwinians
stress the difficulty of seeing truth, period. Indeed, Darwinism comes close to
calling into question the very meaning of the word truth. For the social
discourses that supposedly lead to truth—moral discourse, political discourse,
even, sometimes, academic discourse—are, by Darwinian lights, raw power
struggles. A winner will emerge, but there's often no reason to expect that
winner to be truth. A cynicism deeper than Freudian cynicism may have once
seemed hard to imagine, but here it is.
This Darwinian brand of cynicism
doesn't exactly fill a gaping cultural void. Already, various avant-garde
academics—"deconstructionist" literary theorists and anthropologists,
adherents of "critical legal studies"—are viewing human communication
as "discourses of power." Already many people believe what the new
Darwinism underscores: that in human affairs, all (or at least much) is
artifice, a self-serving manipulation of image. And already this belief helps
nourish a central strand of the postmodern condition: a powerful inability to
take things seriously.
Ironic self-consciousness is the
order of the day. Cutting-edge talk-shows are massively self-referential, with
jokes about cue cards written on cue cards, camera shots of cameras, and a
general tendency for the format to undermine itself. Architecture is now about
architecture, as architects playfully and, sometimes, patronizingly meld motifs
of different ages into structures that invite us to laugh along with them. What
is to be avoided at all costs in the postmodern age is earnestness, which
betrays an embarrassing naïveté.
Whereas modern cynicism brought
despair about the ability of the human species to realize laudable ideals,
postmodern cynicism doesn't-not because it's optimistic, but because it can't
take ideals seriously in the first place. The prevailing attitude is absurdism.
A postmodern magazine may be irreverent, but not bitterly irreverent for it's
not purposefully irreverent; its aim is indiscriminate, because everyone is equally
ridiculous. And anyway, there's no moral basis for passing judgment. Just sit
back and enjoy the show.
It is conceivable that the
postmodern attitude has already drawn some strength from the new Darwinian
paradigm. Sociobiology, however astringent its reception in academia, began
seeping into popular culture two decades ago. In any event, the future progress
of Darwinism may strengthen the postmodern mood. Surely, within academia,
deconstructionists and critical legal scholars can find much to like in the new
paradigm. And surely, outside of academia, one reasonable reaction to
evolutionary psychology is a self-consciousness so acute, and a cynicism so
deep, that ironic detachment from the whole human enterprise may provide the
only relief.
Thus the difficult question of
whether the human animal can be a moral animal—the question that modern
cynicism tends to greet with despair—may seem increasingly quaint. The question
may be whether, after the new Darwinism takes root, the word moral can be
anything but a joke.
(pp.
324-326 in The Moral Animal by Robert
Wright)